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COMMENTS
THE POWER PARADOX: THE NEED FOR
ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES IN VIRGINIA MINORITY
SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION CASES
INTRODUCTION
Without advanced planning, minority shareholders in a closely
held corporation can find themselves in the unenviable position of
being up a creek without a paddle. Minority shareholders often
invest in a corporation with the belief that the investment will
provide them with a steady stream of income, either from a job or
from payment of dividends.' Yet many fail to protect themselves
with employment contracts or buy-sell agreements,2 leaving them
vulnerable to a majority shareholder who may decide to fire them
or withhold dividends.' Without a source of income, a minority
shareholder can face an indefinite period when there is no return
on his or her investment.'
To address this problem, many states, including Virginia, have
enacted some form of the Model Business Corporation Act (the
"MBCA").' The MBCA allows for involuntary dissolution of a cor-
1. See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression, 48
BUS. LAW. 699, 702 (1993).
2. See Michael K. Molitor, Eat Your Vegetables (Or At Least Understand Why You
Should): Can Better Warning and Education of Prospective Minority Owners Reduce Op-
pression in Closely Held Businesses?, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491, 495-96 (2009).
3. Thompson, supra note 1, at 703.
4. Id.
5. Harry Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as A Reme-
dy For Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 33 n.31 (1987). In order to
adopt the MBCA, most states name their respective statute according to the model lan-
guage of section 1.01 of the MBCA which states: "This Act shall be known and may be cit-
ed as the '[name of state] Business Corporation Act." MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 1.01 (2007);
see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-601 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2014) (noting that Vir-
ginia chose the language "Virginia Stock Corporation Act"). Specific provisions within Vir-
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poration in certain circumstances.' Dissolution, however, is con-
sidered a drastic remedy as it requires the corporation to enter
into receivership and eventually be sold off.' Because of this,
courts are often hesitant to order dissolution except in cases of
continued and egregious oppression. To address this problem,
courts and legislatures in other jurisdictions have allowed equi-
table remedies, such as buy-outs or the appointment of a provi-
sional director, in cases of minority shareholder oppression.
Although courts in other states have interpreted the MBCA's
oppression provision as allowing equitable remedies,' the Su-
preme Court of Virginia has ruled that Virginia's oppression
statutory scheme provides only for the exclusive remedy of disso-
lution.o Accordingly, it is up to the General Assembly to add equi-
ginia's corporation legislation likewise appear identical or very similar. Compare MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.30(a)(2)(ii) (2007) (the MBCA's oppression subsection within its over-
all dissolution provision), with VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747(A)(1)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum.
Supp. 2013) (Virginia's oppression subsection within its overall dissolution provision).
6. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30 (2007). Those circumstances include:
[(1) where] the directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate
affairs, the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and irreparable
injury to the corporation is threatened or being suffered, or the business and
affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the
shareholders generally, because of the deadlock; [(2)] the directors or those in
control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that
is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent; [(3)] the shareholders are deadlocked in
voting power and have failed, for a period that includes at least two consecu-
tive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms have
expired.
Id.
7. See, e.g., Colgate v. Disthene Group, Inc., 85 Va. Cir. 286, 317 (2012) (Buckingham
County); Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 9-10 (Wash. 2003); Drastic Times Call for
Drastic Measures: A Fairfax County Judge Orders Judicial Dissolution in the Face of Mi-
nority Shareholder Oppression, RICH. B. AsS'N (Sept. 2012), http://www.richmondbar.
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/business_law.tipSeptember_2012.pdf [hereinafter Dras-
tic Times].
8. See, e.g., Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269, 274-75 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Scott, 64
P.3d at 10; cf. Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 361 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
9. See Scott, 64 P.3d at 9; Fix, 538 S.W.2d at 357 n.3 (providing a detailed discussion
of certain equitable remedies used in various jurisdictions).
10. Giannotti v. Hamway, 239 Va. 14, 28, 387 S.E.2d 725, 733 (1990); White v. Per-
kins, 213 Va. 129, 135, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (1972). The Supreme Court of Washington has
interpreted the same statutory language, "a court ... may dissolve a corporation," as al-
lowing for equitable remedies up to and including dissolution. The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia, on the other hand, has found the exact same language to only allow dissolution of a
corporation and nothing more. Compare Scott, 64 P.3d at 9 (finding that alternative reme-
dies are available in addition to dissolution), with Giannoti, 239 Va. at 28, 387 S.E.2d at
733 ("The remedy specified by the legislative while discretionary, is 'exclusive,' and does
not permit the trial court to fashion other, apparently equitable remedies.").
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table remedies to the current statutory scheme. The time has now
come for the General Assembly to take this step and ensure that
trial courts have the authority necessary to address instances of
alleged oppression.
Additional remedies are necessary to allow Virginia trial courts
to respond to the unique circumstances presented in each case.
Without additional remedies, trial courts are left with the choice
of dissolution or dismissal, a stark contrast that ignores the
murkiness of oppression in some cases." To remedy this problem,
this comment includes proposed draft legislation modeled after
Oregon's dissolution statute. This new statute will provide Vir-
ginia courts with the flexibility needed to respond to the facts and
circumstances presented in each unique oppression case.
The proposed statute would add equitable remedies to Virgin-
ia's dissolution statute, allowing courts to order a wide range of
non-exhaustive remedies including an accounting, damages, or
the appointment of an individual as a provisional director. The
proposed statute makes dissolution a last resort option that a
court only considers after other remedies are deemed insufficient.
Further, the statute allows forward-looking shareholders to opt-
out of most of the equitable remedies, excepting dissolution, dam-
ages, and an accounting, through agreement. Thus, the proposed
statute addresses the problems inherent in a dissolution-only re-
gime while providing shareholders with the opportunity to struc-
ture deals that avoid the effects of the statute.
The proposed statute will help give teeth to a law that Virginia
courts are currently hesitant to apply." Although Virginia's op-
pression statute provides some protection to minority sharehold-
ers, it is not generally seen as particularly protective." Instead,
Virginia law calls for significant deference to a corporation's
management under the business judgment rule, which creates a
11. The Virginia statute does provide one other option, a pre-trial buy-out; however,
only the defendant or the corporation may elect to buy-out the plaintiff and end the case.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-749.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
12. See, e.g., Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 304.
13. Drastic Times, supra note 7. It should be noted that Virginia Code section § 13.1-
747 is written such that oppression is addressed as a subsection within the overall dissolu-
tion statute. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013). Despite this
construction, the oppression provision has become the thrust of the statute. For this rea-
son, this article uses the term "oppression statute" when technically referencing the disso-
lution statute generally, of which oppression is addressed in a subsection.
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presumption that a director of a corporation has discharged his
duties "in accordance with his good faith business judgment of the
best interests of the corporation."" While many states apply an
objective standard to a director's decisions in running a corpora-
tion, Virginia applies a subjective view of the director's good faith
business judgment."
Despite this highly deferential atmosphere, the recent Virginia
case of Colgate v. Disthene Group shows that Virginia courts will
not defer to a corporation's directors in any and all circumstanc-
es.1 Colgate involved a decades-long family dispute over the
management of a kyanite mine and other operations, which col-
lectively were worth millions." The trial court held that the busi-
ness judgment rule was inapplicable as it required directors to
"actually exercise their good faith business judgment."" Since the
court found there was "no reason to believe that the management
of Disthene will ever treat the Plaintiffs fairly," dissolution was
the appropriate remedy.
This comment addresses where Virginia's current scheme falls
short and why equitable remedies are needed in Virginia minori-
ty shareholder oppression cases. Part I looks at how the MBCA
attempted to solve the problem of minority shareholder oppres-
sion. Part II explores how other jurisdictions have interpreted or
added to the MBCA so as to provide additional remedies in mi-
nority shareholder oppression cases. Finally, Part III advocates
for adoption of a new dissolution statute in Virginia that includes
equitable remedies for such cases.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
15. Compare In re MFW Shareholders Litig., 67 A.2d 496, 500 (Del. Ch. 2013) (ex-
plaining Delaware's business judgment rule is an objective standard: "Under [Delaware's
business judgment rule] the court is precluded from inquiring into the substantive fairness
of [a director's decision] . . . unless [that decision was] so disparate that no rational person
acting in good faith could have thought the [decision] was fair to the minority.") (emphasis
added), with VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013) (stating that
courts consider whether a director fulfilled his duties in "accordance with his good faith
business judgment") (emphasis added).
16. Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 317.
17. Id. at 287-88; see also Bill McKelway, Jurists Rejects Appeal of Firm's Dissolution;
Va. High Court Refuses Kyanite Company's Bid to Overturn Liquidation, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Feb. 17, 2013, at B01 ("In all, Disthene holdings are believed to be valued at
some $200 million.").
18. Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 294 (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 317.
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I. TREATMENT OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS UNDER THE MBCA
The closely held corporate environment is particularly prone to
abuse of minority shareholders who fail to protect themselves.2 0
These corporations are often started by friends or family mem-
bers with little or no business experience." Furthermore, the ini-
tial shareholders often decide against consulting an attorney,
finding it an unnecessary expense." In determining that minority
shareholders should be protected from abuse, many states, in-
cluding Virginia," have enacted the MBCA." The MBCA offers
some protection to minority shareholders who might otherwise be
stuck in the undesirable position of possessing stock without the
means to profit therefrom." Virginia's General Assembly has also
gone one step further by enacting a pre-trial buy-out remedy,
which allows the defendants or the corporation to buy-out the
plaintiffs ownership interest in the corporation prior to trial."
This section describes the problems unique to closely held corpo-
rations and how Virginia's current statutory scheme fails to ade-
quately address those problems.
A. The Problem with Closely Held Corporations
Minority shareholders often invest in corporations with their
family or friends." Many possess a useful skillset and plan to
work for the corporation. 8 Thus, many shareholders invest with
the belief that their investment will lead to steady income, either
from a job or from dividends." Minority shareholders often fail,
however, to protect themselves before buying into a corporation
20. See Thompson, supra note 1, at 702.
21. Id.; Molitor, supra note 2, at 491.
22. See Molitor, supra note 2, at 491-93.
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-60 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013); id. § 13.1-
747(A)(1)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
24. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.0101 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-1-01 (2013); see also
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 1.01 (2007) (outlining the model provision language with which
specific states may adopt the MBCA).
25. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.30 (2007).
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-749.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
27. See Molitor, supra note 2, at 491.
28. Thompson, supra note 1, at 702.
29. Id.
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by not utilizing employment contracts or buy-sell agreements."
Without any protection, minority shareholders are left susceptible
to the decisions of the majority shareholder, who may decide to
terminate the minority shareholder or reduce dividend pay-
ments." This lack of control can sometimes leave a minority
shareholder facing an indefinite period of time where he is not
earning any income back from his investment." Some minority
shareholders, through no fault of their own, are even put in this
position when they inherit their shares.
As an example of how a minority shareholder could invest in a
corporation and fail to engage in the advanced planning neces-
sary to protect himself, consider this hypothetical.
Individuals A, B, and C, all friends, incorporate the ABC Cor-
poration to make widgets. All three have an equal share in the
corporation, each owning 33% of the stock. All three are also em-
ployed in various positions of the corporation. None of the owners
bother to draft an employment agreement, nor do they agree to a
buy-sell arrangement or any other protections prior to investing
together. All three believe that, as equal owners, their status as
employees is protected. After several successful years making
widgets, with all three partners receiving respectable salaries
and dividend payouts, personality and business conflicts arise
that align A and B against C. In their capacity as a majority of
the directors, A and B decide to fire C and cut dividend payments
while increasing their own salaries. This leaves C with no protec-
tion, having been "frozen out"" of a business that he helped cre-
30. See Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability Company:
Learning (or Not) From Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 912
(2005) ("Because close corporation owners are frequently linked by family or other person-
al relationships, there is often an initial atmosphere of mutual trust that diminishes the
sense that contractual protection is needed."); see also, Molitor, supra note 2, at 493, 496
(referring more generally to ways in which minority shareholders fail to protect them-
selves at the outset). Buy-sell agreements can be drafted numerous ways, but may include
provisions addressing who can buy the stock, what price the stock will be sold for, and
what events might trigger a buyout. See Robert W. Wood, In Business? Get a Buy-Sell
Agreement!, FORBES.COM (Feb. 7, 2011, 9:07 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood
/2011/02/07/in-business-get-a-buy-sell-agreement/.
31. Thompson, supra note 1, at 703.
32. Id.
33. The term "frozen out" essentially means being cut off from the business both in
terms of decision making and profiting therefrom. It is commonly used to signal oppres-
sion in the closely held corporation context. See infra note 35.
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ate. With a minority interest, as long as A and B stay aligned in
their decision-making, C has no way to force any change in the
corporation and is left in the unenviable position of owning a fi-
nancial interest with no return on his investment. To make mat-
ters worse, C has lost his primary source of income-employment
at ABC Corporation. Finally, since this is a closely held corpora-
tion, with no shares listed on a public stock exchange, C has no
market in which to sell his interest. Looking forward, were C to
bring a successful claim for oppression, the only remedy currently
available to the court is dissolution of the corporation-a forced
sale of the business. Of course, A and B could step in and buy the
corporation back, which would essentially amount to a buy-out of
C's interest, but only if A and B have enough liquid assets to pur-
chase the corporation or secure a loan for the purchase. If both A
and B's money is tied up in ABC Corporation, as is often the case,
then A and B might not be able to come up with the funds, and
the business could be purchased by someone else.
As is clear from the hypothetical above, minority shareholders
invest in a corporation with high hopes and big dreams. Minority
shareholders often do not stop to consider what might happen if
relationships sour and, instead, rely on the idea that their per-
sonal relationships with the other investors will survive, and
hopefully even thrive, in the business world." In many cases,
however, the pressure of making business decisions can cause
rifts in those relationships that eventually lead to the "freezing
out"" of one, or possibly more, of the minority shareholders.
If C, in the above hypothetical, considered suing for dissolution,
he would have to lay out exactly how A and B acted oppressively.
Although central to determining whether or not dissolution is ap-
propriate, the MBCA and many state statutes fail to define op-
pression. Instead, state courts have stepped in to provide a defini-
tion. The Supreme Court of Virginia opined in White v. Perkins
that oppression is "a visible departure from the standards of fair
dealing, and a violation of fair play on which every shareholder
34. See Moll, supra note 30, at 912.
35. Id. at 889-90. "Standard freeze-out techniques include the refusal to declare divi-
dends, the termination of a minority shareholder's employment, the removal of a minority
shareholder from a position of management, and the siphoning off of corporate earnings
through high compensation to the majority shareholder, quite often, these tactics are used
in combination." Id.
2014] 293
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who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely."" The
Supreme Court of South Carolina has listed several relevant fac-
tors in finding a violation of fair dealing or fair play, including:
"exclusion from management, withholding of dividends, paying
excessive salaries to majority shareholders, and analogous activi-
ties." Other factors courts have considered include abusive con-
duct, recurring breaches of fiduciary duty, or frustration of a
shareholder's reasonable expectations."0
B. Virginia's Enactment of the MBCA's Oppression Provision
Virginia adopted the MBCA in 1956." Under the MBCA, a
court may order a corporation dissolved in certain specific, exclu-
sive circumstances.40 One of those circumstances is when the di-
rectors, or those in control, have "acted, are acting, or will act in a
manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent."" The law is
specific about remedies available to the court, stating that a trial
court may dissolve a corporation if the plaintiff establishes that
one of the circumstances has been met. 42 The statute does not ex-
pressly allow for any other remedy, and Virginia courts have in-
terpreted Virginia's version of the MBCA as providing for only
one remedy, dissolution, in an oppression case.43
36. 213 Va. 129, 134, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (1972) (citations omitted).
37. See Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 266 n.25 (S.C.
2001); see also Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 377, 386-87 (2004) (noting that most state statutes allowing for dissolution due
to oppression fail to define oppression, leaving the courts to supply a definition).
38. See Siegel, supra note 37, at 387.
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94 (1950) (current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747
(Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013)).
40. Id. § 13.1-747 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013)).
41. Id. § 13.1-747(A)(1)(b) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013). The other two cir-
cumstances are where:
[t]he directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs, the
shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and irreparable injury to the
corporation is threatened or being suffered, or the business and affairs of the
corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the shareholders
generally, because of the deadlock; or (2) [t]he shareholders are deadlocked in
voting power and have failed, for a period that includes at least two consecu-
tive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms have
expired.
Id. §§ 13.1-747(A)(1)(a), (c) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
42. Id. § 13.1-747 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
43. See, e.g., White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 135, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (1972).
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The Supreme Court of Virginia first considered the issue of
whether the MBCA provided for equitable remedies in White v.
Perkins." In White, the plaintiff and the defendant formed a cor-
poration with the defendant as the controlling shareholder.4 ' The
corporation, at the insistence of the defendant, never declared nor
paid dividends. 46 Because the plaintiff was required to pay income
taxes on money that he was not receiving, he became "financially
pressed."" Despite his awareness of the plaintiffs financial situa-
tion, the defendant still refused to declare or pay dividends or, al-
ternatively, agree to a buy-out of either his stock or the plaintiffs
stock.48
The trial court found that the defendant majority shareholder
oppressed the plaintiff minority shareholder and ordered the cor-
poration to declare and pay dividends, as well as other remedies."
On appeal, the supreme court held that, while the trial court
could have ordered the dissolution of the corporation, the court
could not, under the statute, order any alternative remedies.o In
determining that dissolution was the only statutorily available
option, the court stated that Virginia's oppression provision
"clearly shows an intent by the General Assembly that the alter-
natives provided there are exclusive rather than inclusive."5'
Thus, the court in an oppression case is faced with the choice of
either dissolving the corporation or dismissing the case.52
44. Id.
45. Id. at 131, 189 S.E.2d at 317.
46. Id., 189 S.E.2d at 318.
47. Id. at 131-32, 189 S.E.2d at 318.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 130, 189 S.E.2d at 317.
50. Id. at 135, 189 S.E.2d at 320. It should be noted that in White, the court did state
that it clearly could have appointed a custodian with power to continue the business. Id.
It is likely that the White court was alluding to the remedy currently codified at Virginia
Code section 13.1-748(A) which permits a court to appoint a custodian to manage the cor-
poration "while the proceeding is pending." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-748(A) (Repl. Vol. 2011)
(emphasis added). This, however, is a temporary appointment only. Thus when reading
the appointment language in White, one should place his or her emphasis on the exclusivi-
ty of dissolution. It is White's holding that the alternatives to dissolution are exclusive, not
inclusive. White, 213 Va. at 135, 189 S.E.2d at 320. Several subsequent Virginia decisions,
holding that dissolution is the only alternative available to a court in Virginia, support
this interpretation. See infra note 56.
51. White, 213 Va. at 135, 189 S.E.2d at 320.
52. See id. Again, while the White court seemed to indicate that there might be anoth-
er available alternative (i.e., appointing a custodian to continue the business), this lan-
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In finding that dissolution was the only available remedy, the
Supreme Court of Virginia did not elaborate as to why it reached
this conclusion, except for implying that the conclusion was obvi-
ous from the statutory language. " Along with this textual analy-
sis, the court may have based its opinion on other considerations,
including the knowledge that minority shareholders are often-
times able to pursue other causes of actions that provide alterna-
tive remedies, 4 and the idea that courts should promote the use
of contracts to protect minority shareholders before a business
deal is finalized, as opposed to courts providing the sole protec-
tion." Subsequent Virginia opinions have followed the White
court in finding that dissolution is the only remedy available to a
trial court in oppression cases." In Giannotti v. Hamway, the
court held that "[t]he remedy specified by the legislature [dissolu-
tion], while discretionary, is 'exclusive' and does not permit the
trial court to fashion other, apparently equitable remedies."" In
short, White and other courts have narrowly construed the reme-
dies available for cases of shareholder oppression. Under the cur-
rent scheme, dissolution is wholly favored over the recognition of
other equitable remedies.
C. Virginia's Pre-Trial Buyout Option
Following several decades where the only option in oppression
cases was dissolution, the General Assembly enacted a statute
that allows for a pre-trial buyout. Under Virginia Code section
guage would appear to contradict the overall holding in White and how subsequent Virgin-
ia courts have interpreted it and it should be viewed as dicta. See supra note 50. To the
extent that such a remedy is indeed available, it is only a temporary solution. Virginia
courts have not appointed a custodian as a permanent remedy in oppression cases.
53. White, 213 Va. at 135, 189 S.E.2d at 320.
54. For example, a minority shareholder could bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim.
55. In most cases, minority shareholders can protect themselves by entering into em-
ployment agreements, buy-sell agreements, and other contracts prior to investing in a cor-
poration. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-80 (Del. 1993).
The tools of good corporate practice are designed to give a purchasing minori-
ty stockholder the opportunity to bargain for protection before parting with
consideration. It would do violence to normal corporate practice and our cor-
poration law to fashion an ad hoc ruling which would result in a court-
imposed stockholder buy-out for which the parties had not contracted.
Id. However, minority shareholders who inherit their shares do not have this opportunity.
56. See, e.g., Stickley v. Stickley, 43 Va. Cir. 123, 144-46 (1997) (Rockingham County);
Giannotti v. Hamway, 239 Va. 14, 28-29, 387 S.E.2d 725, 733-34 (1990); Jordon v. Bow-
man Apple Prod. Co., 728 F. Supp. 409, 415 (W.D. Va. 1990).
57. Giannotti, 239 Va. at 28, 387 S.E.2d at 733.
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13.1-749.1, a corporation or a shareholder in the corporation, can
elect to buy the shares of the complaining shareholder." An elec-
tion, however, must be made within ninety days of the filing of a
suit for dissolution, or "at such later time as the court in its dis-
cretion may allow."" The election must be done prior to trial, as
once the election is made, a fair value of the shares will be deter-
mined either by agreement among the parties or, if they are una-
ble to agree, by the court."o An election is "irrevocable unless the
court determines that it is equitable to set aside or modify the
election."6 ' After the fair value of the shares is determined, the
court must enter an order directing the purchase of the shares,
and may also award the petitioning shareholder reasonable at-
torney fees and expert fees if the court determines that the peti-
tioner's claims under section 13.1-747 were meritorious.6 2 Fur-
ther, once a buy-out order is entered, the court must dismiss the
petition to dissolve, and the petitioning shareholder "no longer
ha[s] any rights or status as a shareholder of the corporation, ex-
cept the right to receive the amounts awarded to him by the order
of the court.""
The buy-out alternative was enacted to provide a "less Draco-
nian remedy" in cases of shareholder conflict, while at the same
time ensuring that no shareholder had a tactical advantage over
the other shareholders.6 4 With the possibility of a pre-trial buy-
out, a shareholder interested in pursuing dissolution now must
consider the potential exposure that he risks to a pre-trial buy-
out." As one trial court observed, "[i]t is perhaps an unintended
result of the statute that a plaintiff who originally sought to dis-
solve a corporation ends up in a proceeding to establish value that
provides for no formal discovery."" Thus, pursuing dissolution
might lead to a forced sale in a proceeding where the plaintiff
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-749.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
59. Id. § 13.1-749.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
60. Id. § 13.1-749.1(C)-(D) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
61. Id. § 13.1-749.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
62. Id. § 13.1-749.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
63. Id. § 13.1-749.1(F) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
64. Allen C. Goolsby & Louanna 0. Heuhsen, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Corpo-
rate and Business Law, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 165, 194 (2005).
65. See id.
66. Hartley v. Marco Invs., Inc., 82 Va. Cir. 294, 295 (2011) (Norfolk City).
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does not have formal access to discovery and may be left with an
agreement that contains unfavorable terms.
D. Colgate v. Disthene Group
Since the enactment of the pre-trial buyout, Virginia has only
seen two cases involving minority shareholder oppression go to
trial." The most recent case, Colgate v. Disthene Group, involved
two sides of a family fighting over the management of a prosper-
ous business in Buckingham County." As one local news reporter
summarized, this case "redefined Virginia business law, [and] ex-
posed the withering business practices of a generations-old family
mining and landholding concern."o
The Colgate case focused on the complicated and dramatic rela-
tionships between the descendants of Guy Dixon, who first
bought a kyanite mine at a bankruptcy sale in 1945.71 After Dix-
on's death, one side of the family inherited a majority of the
shares, including all of the voting stock,72 while the other side in-
herited a minority share of all non-voting stock." Following sev-
eral years of low dividend payments and evidence of "exorbitant"
salaries, the minority shareholders filed suit against the majority
shareholders. The minority shareholders asserted, among other
allegations, that they were being oppressed, accusing the majori-
ty shareholders of authorizing large bonuses while cutting divi-
dends. The minority shareholders sought dissolution of the Dis-
thene Group.76
67. Id.; Goolsby & Heuhsen, supra note 64, at 194.
68. The first case, Cattano v. Bragg, centered on whether a minority shareholder
could simultaneously bring a derivative suit and an individual action for judicial dissolu-
tion. 283 Va. 638, 643, 727 S.E.2d 625, 626 (2012).
69. 85 Va. Cir. 286, 287-89 (2012) (Buckingham County).
70. Bill McKelway, Chase City Man Finally Prevails in Kyanite Case, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH (Sept. 23, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/state-regional/
chase-city-man-finally-prevails-in-kyanite-case/article_1 129d777-ad2f-5ec3-acde-flbfd742
f5dc.html [hereinafter McKelway, Chase City Man].
71. Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 287.
72. Id. at 288.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 289.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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The trial court found that several of the actions taken by the
majority shareholders were oppressive and "visibly depart[ed]
from the standards of fair dealing."" The court first determined
that the majority shareholders purposely withheld dividend pay-
ments as retaliation for previous trust litigation pursued by the
minority shareholders." The court further found that the majority
shareholders awarded themselves "enormous pay raises and even
larger bonuses" during the same period of time. 9 In its conclu-
sion, the court stated that the minority shareholders had "been
treated as irksome interlopers, problems to be dealt with, prefer-
ably by squeezing them out at a below market price, or slashing
their dividends in the hope of depriving them of the financial
wherewithal to seek legal recourse.""0 The trial court then held
that dissolution was appropriate and ordered the Disthene Group
dissolved."
Following the trial court's order of dissolution, this case was
considered a potential "turning point in Virginia's judicial ap-
proach to the rights and protections of minority shareholders."82
The plaintiffs expert witness opined that the holding would "help
bolster minority shareholder investment in Virginia companies
because of the protections the decision carries for minority share-
holders."" The parties ultimately settled, wherein the defendants
agreed to buy out the plaintiffs for $70 million, 4 after an appeal
to the Supreme Court of Virginia was eventually granted.o
Another Virginia case involving possible oppression is current-
ly working its way through the courts. The case involves the be-
loved Virginia landmark, Luray Caverns, owned by the Graves
77. Id. at 295, 298.
78. Id. at 296.
79. Id. at 297.
80. Id. at 316-17.
81. Id. at 317.
82. Drastic Times, supra note 7.
83. Id.
84. Bill McKelway, Kyanite Mining Case Finally Comes to a Close, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, June 11, 2013, at Bl.
85. The Supreme Court of Virginia denied the first appeal request. The defendants
then petitioned for a rehearing, which was granted by the supreme court. See Bill
McKelway, Kyanite Mining Case Going to Virginia Supreme Court, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH
(June 10, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/kyanite-mining-case-go
ing-to-virginia-supreme-court/article-d5e573ca-alal-51f6-80c1-fe573536ce28.html [here-
inafter McKelway, Mining Case Going to Virginia Supreme Court].
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family and worth approximately $20 million." Prior to the death
of their parents, there were several internal disputes among the
six siblings over who should run the caverns and who should be
trustee for the family's multiple trusts.8 ' The fighting exploded in-
to multiple lawsuits over the last several decades, with accusa-
tions against one sibling for creating "golden parachutes" for her-
self and two of her brothers, and against that same sibling for
acting "imperial" when she managed the caverns and freezing out
another brother from all decision-making."
Although the Luray case is still pending, the Colgate decision
has important implications for how the case may turn out. With
what appears to be a similar fact pattern, including one side of
the family controlling the business and providing themselves with
excessive monetary benefit, it is quite possible that any trial al-
leging oppression could result in dissolution." Even without the
Supreme Court of Virginia ultimately deciding the Colgate case,
the combination of the trial court's decision"0 and the high settle-
ment in Colgate may provide the Luray defendants with addi-
tional incentive to settle any case alleging oppression to avoid
risking dissolution.
Virginia's statutory scheme currently offers only limited reme-
dies in minority shareholder oppression cases. A plaintiff can at-
tempt to negotiate an informal resolution with the majority
shareholders or sue for dissolution." After suit has been filed, the
corporation or other shareholders have the option to buy-out the
plaintiff." Once the case gets to trial, however, the only remedy
86. Ken Otterbourg, The Rift-A Family Dynasty Fights Over the Future of Luray
Caverns, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2013, at A-101.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Professor Carl Tobias, a law professor at the University of Richmond School of
Law, who closely followed the case opined that the circuit court's "careful opinion will
withstand scrutiny [by the supreme court] because [the judge's] ruling on the law was cor-
rect and [the judge] is closest to the underlying facts, having heard weeks of testimony at
the trial level." McKelway, Mining Case Going to Virginia Supreme Court, supra note 85.
91. Cf. James Irving, Minority Shareholder Rights in Virginia, BEAN KINNEY &
KORMAN PC (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.beankinney.com/publications-articles-minority-
shareholder-rights-virginia.html (noting that the business judgment rule is a potential
defense for defendants in dissolution suits but only if they have not wholly refused to par-
ticipate in the informal negotiation process).
92. See source cited supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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available to the judge is dissolution." Recognizing the limitations
inherent in the MBCA's oppression provision, other jurisdictions
have expanded the remedies available to courts in oppression
94
cases.
II. LESSONS LEARNED FROM REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN OTHER
JURISDICTIONS
A majority of states have enacted the MBCA, which provides
for an oppression cause of action." Delaware, however, has decid-
ed against allowing oppression causes of action, instead finding
that minority shareholders in such circumstances are protected
by fiduciary duty requirements. Of those states that allow op-
pression cases, many have allowed additional remedies besides
dissolution. Courts in some states, such as Washington and Mis-
souri, have interpreted the oppression provision in the MBCA as
granting a wide range of remedies." Legislatures in other states,
such as Illinois, have explicitly added alternative remedies to
their statutes.97 Virginia should follow the lead of other MBCA
states that allow equitable remedies in oppression cases.
A. Requiring Minority Shareholders to Protect Themselves on the
Front End
Delaware, the "pre-eminent jurisdiction in corporate law,"" has
not adopted the MBCA. Instead, Delaware case law provides for a
cause of action based on breach of fiduciary duties owed to minor-
ity shareholders by majority shareholders but does not recognize
93. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013); see also supra
notes 50-57 (noting the exclusively of dissolution as remedy for oppression).
94. See infra Part II.
95. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 1.01, 14.30 (2007); Haynsworth, supra note 5, at 33
n.31; see also supra note 5 (for more discussion on the adoption of the MBCA and its op-
pression provision).
96. Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 9-10 (Wash. 2003); Fix v. Fix Material Co.,
538 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
97. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.50(b) (2013) ("As an alternative to dissolution, the court
may order any of the other remedies contained in subsection (b) of Section 12.55") (refer-
ring to the remedies of appointing a custodian to manage the business or the appointing of
a provisional director to serve for a particular term under court-prescribed terms).
98. Siegel, supra note 37, at 378.
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an oppression cause of action. Although an oppression claim was
once heard by a Delaware Chancery Court judge in Litle v. Wa-
ters," the Supreme Court of Delaware quickly overruled this opin-
ion and elucidated that minority shareholders of closely held cor-
porations in Delaware could not bring a case alleging
*100oppression.
Litle was the first Delaware case to recognize a separate cause
of action for oppression by minority shareholders and some found
the opinion surprising.o' The idea that oppression could be a sep-
arate cause of action under Delaware common law was short-
lived. In 1993, one year after the Litle opinion was announced, a
different chancery court judge stated: "I do not read Litle as es-
tablishing an independent cause of action for 'oppressive abuse of
discretion' distinct from a cause of action based on a breach of fi-
duciary duty."'02 This line of reasoning was similarly adopted by
the Delaware Supreme Court, which held in Nixon v. Blackwell
that there was no separate cause of action based on oppression.10
In Nixon, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants attempted
to force a sale of the plaintiffs stock back to the corporation by
cutting dividends and breached "their fiduciary duties by author-
izing excessive compensation for themselves and other employ-
ees," among other allegations.o' The trial court ordered a buy-out
of the plaintiffs' stock."0 ' On appeal, the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware reversed, finding that the trial court's judgment went
against the "well established . . . jurisprudence that stockholders
need not always be treated equally for all purposes."' In so hold-
ing, the court found it significant that the plaintiffs were neither
employees of the corporation nor were they "protected by specific
provisions in the certificate of incorporation, by-laws, or a stock-
holders' agreement."' Further, the court went on to state that if
99. 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 25, at *25 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 1992).
100. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-80 (Del. 1993).
101. Id.
102. Garza v. TV Answer, Inc., No. 12784 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 40, at *19 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 11, 1993).
103. Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1379-80.
104. Id. at 1373.
105. Id. at 1373-74.
106. Id. at 1376.
107. Id. at 1377.
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equality in the treatment of stockholders were necessary in cor-
porate decision-making, that was a matter for the Delaware legis-
lature to decide, not the courts.1o' Accordingly, minority share-
holders of closely held corporations incorporated in Delaware
cannot bring an independent claim of oppression.
In coming to the conclusion that Delaware law does not require
equal treatment of stockholders, the Nixon court sympathized
with the dilemma which minority shareholders face when at-
tempting to receive the fair market value for their stock with no
market valuation.'09 The court, however, explained that any sym-
pathy was "in the abstract" only, as any stock purchaser in reality
could bargain for more control and more rights before purchasing
the stock."o In so doing, the stock purchaser "make[s] a business
judgment whether to buy into such a minority position, and if so
on what terms.""' The stock purchaser further has the ability to
protect himself on the front-end by entering into stockholder
agreements that "provide for elaborate earnings tests, buy-out
provisions, voting trusts, or other voting agreements.""2 Thus, the
Nixon court found that "[t]he tools of good corporate practice are
designed to give a purchasing minority stockholder the opportuni-
ty to bargain for protection before parting with consideration.""
Finally, the court held that "[i]t would do violence to normal cor-
porate practice and our corporation law to fashion an ad hoc rul-
ing which would result in a court-imposed stockholder buy-out for
which the parties had not contracted."1 4
In disallowing shareholder oppression actions, the Nixon court
clearly believed that Delaware law provides sufficient protection
for minority shareholders through the courts' commitment to en-
forcing fiduciary duties."' Delaware courts still "critically exam-
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1379.
110. Id. at 1379-80.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1380.
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1379-81 ("It would run counter to the spirit of the doctrine of independent
legal significance ... for this Court to fashion a special judicially-created rule for minority
investors . . . ."); see also Siegel, supra note 37, at 404 ("Subsequently, the Delaware Su-
preme Court in Nixon confirmed . .. that there is no separate cause of action for oppres-
sion or for frustration of reasonable expectations."). By discouraging litigation, Delaware
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ine otherwise ordinary decisions that were, in reality, designed to
starve out the minority shareholder."1 6 Thus, "while shareholders
in [Delaware] will not have their reasonable expectations or mere
preferences satisfied, it is a gross exaggeration to assume that
courts in these states would permit these shareholders to be
abused."'"7 However, given that Delaware's entire fairness stand-
ard does not require equality, there is still the possibility that a
financial freeze-out may result, or alternatively, may be allowed
to persist due to a court's hesitancy to find oppression under the
doctrine of entire fairness."'
Although front-end protection through contract is ideal, and
should be encouraged by the courts, simply expecting a minority
shareholder to protect himself upfront ignores the reality of who
most minority shareholders are and what information is available
to them prior to purchasing a minority interest in a corporation."'
First, those involved in a closely held corporation are frequently
friends or family members.'20 These personal relationships help
create "an initial atmosphere of mutual trust that diminishes the
sense that contractual protection is needed."'"' To correct this
courts may also be trying to prevent the significant corporate turmoil that accompanies
litigation. As one commentator noted, "[t]raditional litigation of such shareholder disputes
may be the legal equivalent of killing the goose that lays the golden egg." Susan Marma-
duke, A Statutory Escape Route: Shareholder Disputes, 70 OR. ST. B. BULL. 36, 36 (2010).
In such circumstances, "[bly the time the parties' rights are finally adjudicated, the com-
pany may be damaged beyond repair: Working relationships are destroyed; legal fees and
costs are crushing; and key employees are distracted from attending to the needs of the
enterprise and its customers." Id.
116. Siegel, supra note 37, at 453.
117. Id. at 457.
118. See Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1381. The entire fairness standard requires two things: fair
dealing and a fair pricing.
The former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it
was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the
approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. The latter as-
pect of fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the
proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earn-
ings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or in-
herent value of a company's stock.
Id. at 1376 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983)). Although
entire fairness is a more stringent standard than the deferential business judgment rule,
it does not require shareholders to be treated equally, as made clear by the Nixon court.
Id.
119. See Moll, supra note 30, at 912.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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mentality, states could enact legislation that would require own-
ers of limited liability companies and corporations to read warn-
ings about the risks of starting a business or "purchasing an equi-
ty interest in an existing closely-held [corporation]" without
advanced planning.12  Increasing the educational opportunities
available to owners would increase the likelihood of advance
planning, and subsequently provide for better protection of a mi-
nority shareholder's interests. 123
B. Interpreting the Oppression Provision as Expansive and
Allowing Alternative Remedies
Courts in other jurisdictions that have enacted the MBCA, in-
cluding Washington and Missouri, have interpreted their statutes
to allow for remedies up to and including dissolution in minority
shareholder oppression cases.' The Supreme Court of Washing-
ton and the Missouri Court of Appeals have both held that the
MBCA does not limit a court's equitable power.125
1. Washington
In Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton held that the MBCA's oppression provision allows for equita-
ble remedies other than dissolution.126 The plaintiff in Scott filed
suit against the defendant alleging, among other things, oppres-
sion and misapplication or waste of corporate assets.2"' The plain-
122. Molitor, supra note 2, at 496.
123. Id. at 581, 585. Again, however, one must consider the mentality of an unsophisti-
cated shareholder starting a corporation (who might breeze through any reading material
provided him by the state) and those shareholders who inherited their interest in the cor-
poration.
124. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.494 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Legis. Sess.); WASH.
REV. CODE § 23B.14.300 (2012); see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 1OA-2-14.30 (LexisNexis 2013); ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-11430 (2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-33-1430 (2001); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 30-1-1430 (2013); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30
(2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.952 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L. of 2014 Reg.
Legis. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A-1430 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-24-301
(2012).
125. Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 4-5, 9 (Wash. 2003); Fix v. Fix Material
Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 356-57 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
126. Scott, 64 P.3d at 9-10.
127. Id. at 4.
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tiff requested dissolution, which the trial court granted. 128 The
Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, finding no
abuse of discretion by the trial court."12 The Supreme Court of
Washington reversed the order of dissolution, holding that the ev-
idence presented in support of dissolution was not sufficient for
such a drastic remedy when other, less drastic remedies could
have been ordered by the trial court and were appropriate under
the circumstances.130
Washington's oppression statute, just like Virginia's, states
that a trial court may dissolve a corporation if there is oppres-
sion.' In determining that the statute allowed for remedies other
than oppression, the Supreme Court of Washington reasoned that
dissolution suits were "fundamentally equitable in nature."'32 Re-
lying on this conclusion, the court reasoned that trial courts faced
with an oppression case could consider alternative equitable rem-
edies.3 3 Those remedies included: (1) an entry of an order requir-
ing dissolution at a future date if the shareholders could not come
to an agreement; (2) appointment of a receiver to run the affairs
of the corporation; and (3) "an award of damages to [the] minority
shareholders ... for any injury suffered by them."1 34 The Scott
court further found that "[d]issolution should not be granted as a
matter of right, since the provision allowing judicial dissolution is
'clearly couched in language of permission.""" Thus, while Wash-
ington's oppression statute "grants. .. courts discretion to dis-
solve a corporation when those in control of the corporation are
acting oppressively," the courts should not exercise such discre-
tion unless "a remedy as severe as involuntary dissolution" is
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 10.
131. WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.14.300(2)(b) (2012).
132. Scott, 64 P.3d at 9.
133. Id. (citing Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)).
134. Id. (quoting Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 395-96 (Or.
1973)).
135. Id. at 5 (quoting Henry George & Sons, Inc. v. Cooper-George, Inc., 632 P.2d 512,
516 (Wash. 1981)).
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necessary given the circumstances of the particular case." Sub-
sequent Washington court opinions have taken the supreme
117court's lead, ordering a variety of remedies in oppression cases.
2. Missouri
The Missouri Court of Appeals has also held that dissolution is
not an exclusive remedy under the MBCA.13 8 In Fix v. Fix Materi-
al Co., the plaintiff sued under Missouri's Business Corporation
Act, seeking dissolution of the closely held corporation in which
she was a minority shareholder due to oppressive conduct by
those in control."' The plaintiff presented evidence of long-term
employment contracts that the defendants awarded themselves
as well as salary increases given to the defendants during years
when the company suffered net losses."o Although the court af-
firmed summary judgment for the defendants, it held that the de-
fendants' actions were "narrowly close" to oppression, and that a
future suit by the plaintiff might be successful if the defendant's
course of action failed to change."' The Fix court further ruled
that, if a future suit was brought, the trial court had the power to
order a variety of equitable remedies, including payment of dam-
ages, declaration of a dividend, buy-out of a minority sharehold-
er's stocks, and, if warranted, dissolution."2
In an earlier decision, the Missouri Court of Appeals found that
a previous version of the oppression statute, which allowed for
liquidation of a corporation when the majority stockholders acted
oppressively, was permissive in nature, and the courts were "not
restricted to that remedy."14' Thus, both the Supreme Court of
136. Id. at 10.
137. See, e.g., Skarbo v. Skarbo Scandinavian Furniture Imp., Nos. 54288-5-1, 54470-5-
I, 2005 WL 1950599, at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2005) (ordering a buy-out of the mi-
nority shareholder's shares); Snopac Prods. v. Spencer, No. 66115-9-1, 2012 WL 2688797,
at *6-9 (Wash. Ct. App. July 9, 2012) (affirming the buyout of the minority shareholder's
shares and payment of attorney fees as both were reasonable given the evidence).
138. Fix, 538 S.W.2d at 356-57.
139. Id. at 354.
140. Id. at 356, 359.
141. Id. at 361.
142. Id. at 357 n.3 (quoting Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387,
395-96 (Or. 1973)).
143. Kirtz v. Grossman, 463 S.W.2d 541, 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). This liquidation
statute has since been replaced by Missouri's adoption of the MBCA's oppression provi-
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Washington and the Missouri Court of Appeals have found that
the very language of the MBCA oppression provision allows for
equitable remedies on its face, with no need to modify the statute
to explicitly add additional remedies.!4 Other state courts have
ruled similarly and allowed equitable remedies despite dissolu-
tion being the only remedy expressly available under the stat-
ute. 4
C. Adding a Non-Exhaustive List of Remedies to the Oppression
Statute
Other jurisdictions have modified the MBCA's oppression pro-
vision to include a list of equitable remedies that the trial courts
can consider as an alternative to dissolution.14 ' To further illus-
trate this point, three states will serve as examples. First, New
Jersey has added a list of remedies for use in oppression cases
where the corporation has twenty-five or less shareholders."' Se-
cond, Illinois has added a non-exhaustive list of potential reme-
dies available in all oppression cases.148 Finally, Oregon has added
a non-exhaustive list of equitable remedies that is very similar to
Illinois' statute.'49
s1on.
144. Id.; Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 9, 10 (Wash. 2003); Fix, 538 S.W.2d at
357.
145. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 274 (Alaska 1980) (finding
that Alaska's dissolution statute allowed equitable remedies). Although this case was de-
cided under prior law, Alaska's current dissolution statute is quite similar. See ALASKA
STAT. § 10.06.628 (2012); see also Maddox v. Norman, 669 P.2d 230, 235 (Mont. 1983) ("We
hold that [Montana's previous oppression statute] is permissive rather than mandatory,
and that district courts are empowered, but not required, to liquidate when corporate as-
sets have been misapplied or wasted."). Montana's legislature has since adopted a new
statute that lists alternative remedies available to courts. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-
939 (2013).
146. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1434 (West 2013) (providing a pre-trial buy-out
option that is very similar to Virginia's buy-out provision, Virginia Code section 13.1-
749.1); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 1434(3) (2013) (adding alternative remedies to
Maine's oppression statute).
147. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(c) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Legis. Sess.).
148. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a)-(b) (2013).
149. Compare OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.952(1)-(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L.
of 2014 Reg. Legis. Sess.) (setting forth a non-exhaustive list of remedies available to
shareholders of a close corporation in Oregon), with 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12.56(a)-(b)
(2013) (setting forth a non-exhaustive list of remedies available to shareholdes in non-
public corporations).
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1. New Jersey
New Jersey is one of the few states where the state legislature
added a list of alternative remedies to the MBCA. Under New
Jersey's statute, the trial court has the authority to "appoint a
custodian, appoint a provisional director, order a sale of the cor-
poration's stock. . . , or enter a judgment dissolving the corpora-
tion . . . .""so Pursuant to the statute, a provisional director ap-
pointed by a court would have all the authority and power of an
elected director of the corporation, "including the right to notice of
and to vote at meetings.""' Further, a custodian is given even
more power. ... 1 A custodian appointed by the court may "exer-
cise all of the powers of the corporation's board and officers to the
extent necessary to manage the affairs of the corporation in the
best interests of its shareholders and creditors . . . " subject only
to court-imposed limitations."' New Jersey's statute makes clear
that remedies for minority shareholder oppression are only avail-
able in cases where the corporation has twenty-five or less share-
holders."'
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has interpreted New Jer-
sey's oppression provision as responding "at least in part, to the
fact that traditional principles of corporate law were often unsuc-
cessful at curbing abuses of power by majority interests in close-
ly-held corporations."' The addition of alternative remedies was
accordingly meant to "increas[e] the willingness of courts to in-
tervene and provide relief to shareholders."'56 Although expected
to even the balance of power, the Brenner v. Berkowitz court cau-
tioned that the statute was "meant only to protect the minority,
not to provide a weapon to enable it to obtain unfair advantage
against the majority.""' Finally, while a review of the relevant
authorities does not overtly shed light on why the New Jersey leg-
150. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(1) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Legis. Sess.).
151. Id. § 14A:12-7(3).
152. See id. § 14A:12-7(4).
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. Id. § 14A:12-7(1)(c).
155. Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1026 (N.J. 1993) (quoting Walensky v. Jona-
than Royce Int'l, Inc., 624 A.2d 613, 616 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)).
156. Id. at 1032.
157. Id. at 1030 (quoting Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close
Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1730 (1990)).
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islature limited the availability of alternative remedies in oppres-
sion cases to corporations with twenty-five or less shareholders, it
is plausible that this limitation is meant to recognize the fact that
the most vulnerable shareholders are usually those who start, or
enter into, corporations with family and friends that are general-
ly small and have only a few shareholders.
2. Illinois
Illinois is another state where the legislature added additional
remedies other than dissolution in cases of minority shareholder
oppression.' Under Illinois' Business Corporation Act, the trial
court can order a variety of remedies in oppression cases, includ-
ing removal from office of an officer or director, payment of divi-
dends, award of damages, and a buy-out." Dissolution may also
be ordered, but only if the court determines that any alternative
remedy would be insufficient."' The statute goes on to state that
the listed remedies are not exclusive.161 Accordingly, Illinois' legis-
lature has cloaked Illinois courts with broad discretionary power
to order appropriate remedies in minority shareholder oppression
cases.
Illinois' General Assembly adopted its oppression statute, along
with the list of remedies, in response to the Illinois' courts aver-
sion toward granting relief in cases where "shareholder relation-
ships broke down."'62 This aversion led some "shareholders to re-
sort to 'self-help' measures," such as establishing a competing
business, that were "injurious both to themselves and the corpo-
ration.""' Further, in interpreting the policy behind Illinois' op-
pression statute, the Supreme Court of Illinois stated that the al-
ternative remedies were "specifically enacted to . .. increas [e] the
remedies available to minority shareholders and .. . enlarg[e] the
158. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a)(3) (2013).
159. Id. §§ 5/12.56(b)(3), (b)(9)-(11).
160. Id. § 5/12.56(b)(12).
161. Id. § 5/12.56(c).
162. William R. Quinlan & John F. Kennedy, The Rights and Remedies of Shareholders
in Closely Held Corporations Under Illinois Law, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 585, 606 (1998).
163. Id. For example, in Hagshenas v. Gaylord, the plaintiff, following the court's re-
fusal to intervene in a case involving deadlock, established a competing business and be-
gan poaching employees from the defendant's business. 557 N.E.2d 316, 318-20 (I. App.
Ct. 1990).
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discretionary authority of the circuit courts to award relief in sit-
uations which do not warrant dissolution but which do warrant
some other, less severe remedy."" Finally, in support of Illinois'
alternative remedy statute, one commentator argued:
[g]iven the infinite number of ways that business partners can op-
press each other, the Illinois statutory scheme is effective because it
is flexible enough to preserve the assets of the corporation, and be-
cause, at the same time, it provides the disputing parties with a
framework that allows them to work out their differences.1 65
Thus, Illinois' scheme provides a much more flexible framework
for oppression cases than does Virginia's.
3. Oregon
Finally, Oregon's statute is very similar to Illinois' oppression
statute. 66 Oregon's oppression statute provides courts with a non-
exhaustive list of equitable remedies that courts can order. These
remedies include alteration of the corporation's articles of incor-
poration or bylaws,'67 the removal from office of any director or of-
ficer,168 the appointment of an individual as a director or officer,6
or the award of damages to an aggrieved party.o Oregon's statute
further instructs the court that dissolution is only appropriate "if
the court determines that no remedy specified in the [preceding
subsections] or other alternative remedy is sufficient to resolve
164. Schirmer v. Bear, 672 N.E.2d 1171, 1176 (Ill. 1996). Although the court concen-
trated on the alternative remedy statute for public corporations, the court found that its
statutory construction "comports with the current statutory scheme regulating sharehold-
er remedies for nonpublic corporations." Id. The court further noted that the addition of
these alternative remedies was a direct response to earlier Illinois court decisions holding
that a shareholder in a public corporation could not be granted an alternative remedy un-
less the defendant's conduct rose to a level that justified dissolution. Id. at 1175-76; see
also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.55 (2012) (listing remedies available to a shareholder in a
public corporation who is alleging oppression by controlling shareholders).
165. Quinlan & Kennedy, supra note 162, at 615.
166. Compare OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.952(1)-(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L.
of 2014 Reg. Legis. Sess.) (Oregon's statute regarding remedies available to shareholders
of a closely held corporation), with 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a)-(b) (2013) (Illinois'
statute regarding remedies available to shareholders of private coporations).
167. OR. REV. STAT. § 60.952(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L. of 2014 Reg.
Legis. Sess.).
168. Id. § 60.952(2)(c).
169. Id. § 60.952(2)(d).
170. Id. § 60.952(2)(j).
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the matters in dispute."'' Thus, much like Illinois, Oregon courts
are provided with significant discretion to order a variety of rem-
edies in cases involving minority shareholder oppression.
III. VIRGINIA'S GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD EXPAND THE
REMEDIES AVAILABLE FOR OPPRESSION
Virginia's General Assembly should follow Illinois and Oregon's
lead and add equitable remedies to the oppression statute. The
statute should track the language of Oregon's statute by provid-
ing a list of remedies, including alteration of the corporation's ar-
ticles of incorporation or bylaws, the removal from office of any
director or officer, the appointment of an individual as a director
or officer, the award of damages to an aggrieved party, or the dec-
laration of dividends. The statute should also explicitly state that
the remedies are not exclusive and dissolution should be a last
resort option which is only ordered after the court has considered
other remedies and deemed them insufficient.
A. Proposed Statute for Virginia
This proposed legislation is taken from Oregon's oppression
statute. Although Oregon and Illinois' statute are similar in many
aspects, for the reasons discussed below, Oregon's statute better
addresses all the concerns raised by minority shareholder oppres-
sion. The proposed Virginia statute reads, in pertinent part:172
(1) In a proceeding by a shareholder in a corporation that does not
have shares that are listed on a national securities exchange or that
are regularly traded in a market maintained by one or more mem-
bers of a national or affiliated securities association, the circuit court
may order one or-more of the remedies listed in subsection (2) of this
section if it is established that:
(b) The directors or those in control of the corporation have
acted, are acting or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppres-
sive or fraudulent;
(2) The remedies that the court may order in a proceeding under
subsection (1) of this section include but are not limited to the follow-
ing:
171. Id. § 60.952(2)(m).
172. This is an excerpted version of the statute. For the full version, see the Appendix.
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(a) The performance, prohibition, alteration or setting aside of
any action of the corporation or of its shareholders, directors or
officers or any other party to the proceeding;
(b) The cancellation or alteration of any provision in the corpo-
ration's articles of incorporation or bylaws;
(c) The removal from office of any director or officer;
(d) The appointment of any individual as a director or officer;
(e) An accounting with respect to any matter in dispute;
(f) The appointment of a custodian to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation, to serve for the term and under the
conditions prescribed by the court;
(g) The appointment of a provisional director to serve for the
term and under the conditions prescribed by the court;
(h) The submission of the dispute to mediation or another form
of nonbinding alternative dispute resolution;
(i) The issuance of distributions;
(j) The award of damages to any aggrieved party;
(k) The purchase by the corporation or one or more sharehold-
ers of all of the shares of one or more other shareholders for
their fair value and on the terms determined under subsection
(5) of this section;
(1) The retention of jurisdiction of the case by the court for the
protection of the shareholder who filed the proceeding; or
(m) The dissolution of the corporation if the court determines
that no remedy specified in paragraphs (a) to (1) of this subsec-
tion or other alternative remedy is sufficient to resolve the
matters in dispute. In determining whether to dissolve the cor-
poration, the court shall consider among other relevant evi-
dence the financial condition of the corporation but may not re-
fuse to dissolve the corporation solely because it has
accumulated earnings or current operating profits.
(3) The remedies set forth in subsection (2) of this section shall not
be exclusive of other legal and equitable remedies that the court may
impose. Except as provided in this subsection, the shareholders of a
corporation may, pursuant to an agreement, agree to limit or elimi-
nate any of the remedies set forth in subsection,(2) of this section.
The remedies set forth in subsection (2)(e), (j) and (m) [referring to
an accounting, an award of damages, and dissolution] of this section
may not be eliminated.
(4) In determining the appropriate remedies to order under subsec-
tion (2) of this section, the court may take into consideration the rea-
sonable expectations of the corporation's shareholders as they exist-
ed at the time the corporation was formed and developed during the
course of the shareholders' relationship with the corporation and
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with each other. The court shall endeavor to minimize the harm to
the business of the corporation.
As previously mentioned, Oregon and Illinois' oppression stat-
utes are, in many respects, mirror images of each other.7 4 Ore-
gon's statute, however, does have one significant difference that
Virginia should adopt. Under Oregon's statute, shareholders are
allowed to "eliminate any of the remedies" by agreement, except
for the award of damages, an accounting, or dissolution."' As dis-
cussed in more detail below,'7 1 this section helps to relieve some of
the concerns raised by those skeptical of expanding the statutory
remedies available to trial courts in minority shareholder oppres-
sion cases. Virginia would do well to follow suit and adopt the
proposed statute containing a similar provision.
B. Benefits of Expanding the Statutory Remedies in Oppression
Cases
Courts in other states have found that the MBCA allows for
remedies besides dissolution, including buy-outs and the ap-
pointment of custodial receivers to monitor the corporation."'
Courts in these states have allowed for other remedies because,
among other reasons: (i) additional options increases the likeli-
hood that a judge will order an effective remedy, (ii) the courts
should offer some protection to minority shareholders who inherit
their shares or fail to protect themselves when they enter into a
closely held corporation, and (iii) less drastic remedies help pre-
vent power imbalances that are too in favor of either the majority
shareholder or the minority shareholder.
173. As a note, Virginia's pre-trial buy-out statute would still be an option to the de-
fendants or the corporation as a way to end litigation prior to a trial. VA. CODE ANN. §
13.1-749.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013).
174. Compare OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.952(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L. of
2014 Reg. Legis. Sess.) (setting forth the remedies available to shareholders of a closely
held corporation), with 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.56(a) (2013) (setting forth the remedies
available to shareholders of a private coporation).
175. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.952(3) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L. of 2014 Reg.
Legis. Sess.).
176. See infra Part III(B).
177. See supra Parts II(B), (C).
314 [Vol. 49:287
NEED FOR ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
1. Alternative Remedies Increase the Likelihood of an Effective
Remedy Being Ordered
First, additional remedies increase the likelihood that a judge
will order an effective remedy, thereby giving greater protection
to minority shareholders."' In a study that analyzed forty-seven
court decisions involving minority shareholder oppression be-
tween 1984 and 1985, buy-outs were the most common remedy
ordered, comprising 54% of the cases, with dissolution only being
ordered in ten of the cases (or 27%) and other relief besides disso-
lution or buy-outs being ordered in three other cases (8%)."7
Thus, a buy-out was the predominant remedy ordered in jurisdic-
tions that allowed equitable remedies. Another study confirmed
this conclusion, finding that 54% of cases initiated between 1960
and 1976 ended in a buy-out, even in cases where the court de-
nied the plaintiffs relief.' Further, the 1985 study found that
buy-outs were most common in cases involving a family owned
business.'"' With buy-outs being so common, courts should be giv-
en the ability to order this remedy.
As discussed above, Virginia already has a pre-trial buy-out op-
tion. 8 2 Thus, it would appear that Virginia has provided the most
common alternative remedy and no additional change is neces-
sary. However, while pre-trial buy-outs are an option that de-
fendants and corporations should have available to them, some
might decide instead to proceed to trial.' Under the current
statutory regime, once the defendant and corporation have decid-
ed to forego a pre-trial buy-out, the only other remedy available is
dissolution.' The pre-trial buy-out, therefore, does nothing to
178. Haynsworth, supra note 5, at 26.
179. Id. at 51, 53.
180. J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 30, 33
(1977).
181. Haynsworth, supra note 5, at 56.
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-749.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013); supra Part I(C).
183. For example, in Colgate v. Disthene Group, the Disthene Group and its sharehold-
ers chose not to accept a pre-trial settlement or elect to buy-out the plaintiffs. See general-
ly supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Colgate case and pointing out
that the litigation ended in a large buy-out settlement but only after a trial on the merits,
and after the subsequent appeal had been granted).
184. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-749.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013); id. § 13.1-747 (Repl. Vol.
2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013). A plaintiff does not have the option to force a pre-trial buy-out
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remedy the court's reluctance to order dissolution nor does it help
protect minority shareholders should the majority not want to
buy them out.
2. Courts Should Provide Some Protection to Minority
Shareholders Who Fail to Protect Themselves or Who Inherit
Their Shares
Second, the General Assembly should recognize the realities of
human psychology; that is, that people are inherently optimistic
about their own future.'" Although most minority shareholders
have the opportunity to protect themselves prior to purchasing
shares, with the exception being shareholders who are gifted or
inherit their stock, many fail to do so."' Even well-educated peo-
ple might get caught up in the romanticism of starting a business
with their friends or family and, in so doing, decide that the costs
of protection (including hiring an attorney to draft employment or
buy-sell agreements) outweigh any potential risk-especially
when the probabilities of those risks are so far-fetched in the sub-
jective minds of the would-be minority shareholders."' Further,
there is still the segment of minority shareholders who do not
have the opportunity to protect themselves because they either
inherited or were gifted their stock.' These individuals may have
by the defendant or the corporation. Id. § 13.1-749. 1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2013).
185. Molitor, supra note 2, at 554.
186. See id. at 495-96, 554.
187. Moll, supra note 30, at 912; see also Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558
(N.C. 1983) (observing that "close corporations are often formed by friends or family mem-
bers who simply may not believe that disagreements could ever arise"). Further, some in-
dividuals might not be comfortable raising the issue of potential future conflict and protec-
tive agreements, especially when their partners are friends or family. Although clearly not
the exact same situation, it is interesting to consider the unpopularity of prenuptial
agreements even when a person's financial security is at stake. See Beth Potier, For Many,
Prenups Seem to Predict Doom, HARv. U. GAZETTE (Oct. 16, 2003), http://www.news.har
vard.edulgazette/2003/10.16/01-prenup.html. Although this might seem like an almost
laughable comparison in the world of business, it is important to remember the kinds of
people who are more likely to get caught in a cycle of oppression: individuals who do not
have business backgrounds and start a company with their friends or family. See Molitor,
supra note 2, at 491, 554. Thus, minority shareholders, if aware of the types of protection
available, may be uncomfortable raising these issues and instead decide to forego an un-
comfortable conversation with the hope and belief that no issues will arise in the future.
188. Some may argue that, although the descendants had no opportunity to protect
themselves, the original shareholder who bequeathed the minority shares did have such
an opportunity and failed to secure any protection. Thus, Guy Dixon, who originally
bought the kyanite mine and founded the Disthene Group, had the opportunity to leave
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a large portion or even all of their inheritance tied up in a corpo-
ration, with no hope of liquidating any of the inheritance without
the approval of the majority shareholder. For example, the minor-
ity shareholders in Colgate inherited millions in non-voting stock
from their grandfather."' Although the minority shareholders
proposed a buy-out and offered the majority shareholder a set-
tlement after the case was initiated, the majority shareholders re-
fused.
3. Less Drastic Remedies Help Prevent Power Imbalances
Finally, in some circumstances, a court that finds a majority
shareholder's actions concerning, but not rising to the level where
dissolution would be appropriate, has no other remedies to offer
the plaintiff.' Because of this, majority shareholders might be
rewarded for bad behavior that is just shy of continual oppres-
sion. As some scholars have pointed out, courts are reluctant to
order the drastic remedy of dissolution unless there is clear evi-
dence of continued oppression."' This reluctance to order dissolu-
tion undermines the very purpose of the oppression statute-that
is, to protect minority shareholders.19 ' Accordingly, alternative
remedies are necessary to provide courts with flexibility to re-
spond to the various circumstances presented in a case.
his son and daughter an equal share of the business, but chose to create a majority share-
holder and minority shareholder. Colgate v. Disthene Grp., Inc., 85 Va. Cir. 286, 287
(2012) (Buckingham County). This argument ignores the fact that most individuals do not
foresee future problems arising from a minority shareholder situation, particularly in a
family situation where the inheriting parties are siblings or otherwise related.
189. McKelway, Mining Case Going to Virginia Supreme Court, supra note 85. The Dis-
thene Group was worth an estimated $200 million; the plaintiffs owned 42% of the stock.
Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 287.
190. Hetherinton & Dooley, supra note 180, at 9-11 (An oppression action under the
MBCA "require[s] the minority to establish that the majority's conduct is sufficiently cul-
pable to give rise to an action for damages at common law .. . [even in cases involving]
disputable value judgments where courts are traditionally reluctant to interfere with
management decisions.").
191. See, e.g., Moll, supra note 30 at 893-94; see Drastic Times, supra note 7; see also
Scott v. Trans-System, 64 P.3d 1, 10 (Wash. 2003) (finding that the defendants' conduct
did not rise to the continuous level necessary to justify dissolution of the corporation).
192. Although plaintiffs may also bring fiduciary duty claims, the only additional rem-
edy available to them is damages. While paying damages may bring about a change in the
corporate culture, a fiduciary duty claim does not allow a court to judicially sever ties be-
tween the minority shareholder and the corporation, a remedy that might be necessary
given the souring of relationships that led to the lawsuit in the first place.
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C. Counter-Arguments to Adding Equitable Remedies to
Virginia's Oppression Statute
Those critical of adding equitable remedies to the oppression
provision in Virginia's dissolution statute, or alternatively adopt-
ing an independent oppression statute, offer several counter-
arguments against doing so. Those counter-arguments include: (i)
there are very few cases that actually proceed to trial, (ii) minori-
ty shareholders should protect themselves, and (iii) allowing al-
ternative remedies puts too much power in the hands of the judi-
ciary to essentially oversee businesses.
1. Few Cases Actually Advance to Trial
Very few cases alleging minority shareholder oppression are
actually brought in Virginia, raising the question of whether ad-
ditional remedies are necessary to handle so few cases. Indeed,
since 2005, when the Virginia General Assembly allowed pre-trial
buy-out options, only two cases alleging oppression have gone to
trial.'3 Further, some may argue that a minority shareholder is
not bound to bring a dissolution cause of action as his only hope
for remedying a case of oppression; instead, minority sharehold-
ers may also bring fiduciary duty claims or other business tort
claims.
In Colgate, one of only two cases brought following the enact-
ment of the pre-trial buyout option in Virginia, the minority
shareholders also brought a breach of fiduciary duty claim
against the majority shareholders,'9 4 who were also directors. Un-
der Virginia Code section 13.1-690, "[a] director shall discharge
his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of a
committee, in accordance with his good faith business judgment
of the best interests of the corporation."'" They likely would have
won at the trial court level on a fiduciary duty claim. The Colgate
court found that the business judgment rule did not protect the
majority shareholders since "Disthene's board of directors did not
193. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-749.1 (Cum. Supp. 2013); Cattano v. Bragg, 283 Va. 638,
727 S.E.2d 625 (2013); Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 286.
194. Although fiduciary duty claims were brought, the parties agreed to litigate the
oppression claims first. Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 288-90.
195. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
[Vol. 49:287318
NEED FOR ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
act as a board and make informed decisions."'96 Further, the trial
court went on to find that the board "merely bent to [the majority
shareholder's] ironhanded will and rubberstamped his decisions,"
and that "[the majority shareholder and his son] were motivated
not by the best interests of the corporation, but by their personal
best interests." 97
A fiduciary duty claim, however, would not have ended the
family dispute. Although a successful fiduciary duty claim would
have provided the plaintiffs with a steady stream of income, it
might not have stopped continued oppression by the majority
shareholders. While this theory is necessarily speculative, the
majority shareholders' past actions show a pattern of continued
oppression unheeded by judicial action. Several years before the
oppression lawsuit, the Colgate plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging
the looting of the plaintiffs stock, which the majority shareholder
moved out of the family trust and placed into one of the corpora-
tion's many holdings."' Following a ruling for the plaintiffs and a
severe rebuking from the bench, the defendant majority share-
holders agreed to settle the case.'99 Despite the consequences of
the trust litigation, the majority shareholders soon cut the plain-
tiffs dividends while increasing their own pay and bonuses.200 The
majority shareholders' continued oppressive conduct eventually
led to the dissolution lawsuit.2 0 ' Thus, as the Colgate case shows,
equitable remedies are necessary to adequately respond to the
cases that appear before Virginia courts.
2. Minority Shareholders Can Protect Themselves with Contracts
Another argument offered is that, in most cases, minority
shareholders can protect themselves by entering into employment
agreements, buy-sell agreements, and other contracts prior to in-
vesting in a corporation. Unfortunately, human nature leads in-
experienced investors to be overly optimistic of the business's
196. Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 294.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 288; see McKelway, Chase City Man, supra note 70.
199. McKelway, Chase City Man, supra note 70; see Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 288.
200. Colgate, 85 Va. Cir. at 289.
201. Id.
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likely success and too trusting of their business partners.20 For
example, in the hypothetical discussed in Part 1,203 C invested in a
corporation with two of his friends. C believed that, as an equal
owner, his status as an employee of the corporation was protected
and did not protect himself with a buy-sell agreement or an em-
ployment contract. Unfortunately for C, his employee status was
not protected and business conflicts led A and B to agree to fire C
and cut dividend payments.
In order to prevent future investors from making the same mis-
takes as C, some scholars argue that business owners should be
required to learn about ways to protect themselves prior to enter-
ing into a business agreement.20 4 Prospective owners of a corpora-
tion could be required to read a document that outlines potential
risks and ways to protect against those risks prior to being able to
register a corporation.' These documents would be maintained
by the state and made available on the state's website.20 6
This approach, however, would not work for individuals who
inherited a corporation, like the plaintiffs in Colgate. It was, in
fact, the original owner of the corporation (the plaintiffs' grandfa-
ther and defendant's father) who left them with a minori-
ty/majority shareholder situation, instead of giving each line of
descendants an equal share in the corporation."' Yet, requiring
some education prior to the registration of a closely held corpora-
tion would probably reduce the likelihood of oppression and would
lessen the need for alternatives to dissolution.
Further, the proposed statute would allow savvy shareholders
to protect themselves with contracts on the front end while also
protecting those shareholders that did not foresee potential prob-
lems or who were unable to protect themselves.20 8 The proposed
legislation allows shareholders to agree to eliminate all the alter-
native remedies listed, excepting the award of damages, an ac-
202. Thompson, supra note 1, at 705; see also supra notes 185-87 and accompanying
text.
203. See supra Part I(A).
204. See Molitor, supra note 2, at 496.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 575.
207. Colgate v. Disthene Grp., Inc., 85 Va. Cir. 286, 288 (2012) (Buckingham County).
208. See supra Part III(A).
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counting, or dissolution.209 Thus, shareholders who do not want
these alternative remedies to be available in any future disputes
can contract them away. This does not hinder the statute's main
goal-protection of minority shareholders-because those share-
holders are agreeing to terms up front instead of informally form-
ing a corporation with very little protection.
Finally, the proposed statute helps prevent an imbalance of
power in favor of the minority shareholder, who could threaten
havoc with an oppression suit. With alternative remedies availa-
ble, courts that were once hesitant to provide any remedy because
the only remedy was dissolution may now be more willing to or-
der lesser remedies. The increased likelihood of some sort of rem-
edy being awarded to the plaintiff increases the power of the mi-
nority shareholder.2 "o Allowing for an opt-out of almost all the
remedies restores that balance of power while also ensuring that
the minority shareholder understands the vulnerability of his po-
sition prior to exchanging consideration for stock.
3. Allowing Alternative Remedies Places Too Much Power in the
Hands of the Judiciary
A final argument against expanding equitable remedies in mi-
nority shareholder oppression cases is that doing so increases the
judiciary's power and allows a judge to essentially oversee busi-
nesses. It is certainly true that cases that might have previously
been dismissed because the judge was reluctant to order dissolu-
tion may now instead see a ruling in favor of the plaintiff with an
equitable remedy ordered. However, the business judgment rule
still applies in cases of oppression and still creates a presumption
that a director has acted "in accordance with his good faith busi-
ness judgment of the best interests of the corporation.""' It is not
209. See supra Part III(A).
210. As one scholar pointed out, '"[tiraditional litigation of such shareholder disputes
may be the legal equivalent of killing the goose that lays the golden egg."' In such circum-
stances, "[b]y the time the parties' rights are finally adjudicated, the company may be
damaged beyond repair: Working relationships are destroyed; legal fees and costs are
crushing; and key employees are distracted from attending to the needs of the enterprise
and its customers." Marmaduke, supra note 115. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the
corporation and the majority shareholders to avoid litigation when possible, giving the
conniving minority shareholder the power to hold the corporation hostage to potential liti-
gation.
211. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Repl. Vol. 2011 & Cum. Supp. 2013).
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until after the plaintiff has rebutted this presumption and proven
oppression that a judge can grant equitable remedies.212 Equitable
remedies thus protect minority shareholders while not overstep-
ping or overruling the business judgment rule.
CONCLUSION
Currently, minority shareholders who allege oppression in Vir-
ginia may only request dissolution as a remedy.2"' While many
states, either through legislation or case law, have found that
courts have the power to order remedies other than dissolution,2 14
the Supreme Court of Virginia has ruled otherwise. 2 15 Thus, the
supreme court has placed the ball squarely in the General As-
sembly's court-if additional remedies are to be provided, it must
be the General Assembly who acts to change the statute and ex-
plicitly allow such remedies. Legislatures in other states, such as
Oregon, have done just that by adding a non-exhaustive list of al-
ternative remedies to their dissolution statutes in cases of minori-
ty shareholder oppression. 216 The General Assembly should follow
Oregon's lead by adopting the proposed oppression statute or, at
the very least, adding equitable remedies to the dissolution stat-
ute, thereby granting Virginia's trial courts the discretionary
power to order an appropriate remedy based on the unique facts
of a case.
212. As one of the plaintiffs attorneys in Colgate noted, "[u]ntil now, majority share-
holders at many companies in Virginia and elsewhere have been able to run a company for
their own benefit while running roughshod over minority shareholders." Disthene Group
Settlement Bolsters Minority Shareholders' Rights, LECLAIRRYAN (Aug. 22, 2013), http:
//www.leclairryan.com/news/xprNewsDetail.aspx?xpST=NewsDetail&news=1007.
213. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1250(b) (2013); Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538
S.W.2d 351, 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Scott v. Trans-System, Inc., 64 P.3d 1, 3 (Wash.
2003).
215. White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 135, 189 S.E.2d 315, 320 (1972).
216. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.952(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 121 L. of
2014 Reg. Legis. Sess.).
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APPENDIX-PROPOSED DRAFT STATUTE
The full proposed statute would read:
(1) In a proceeding by a shareholder in a corporation that does not
have shares that are listed on a national securities exchange or that
are regularly traded in a market maintained by one or more mem-
bers of a national or affiliated securities association, the circuit court
may order one or more of the remedies listed in subsection (2) of this
section if it is established that:
(a) The directors are deadlocked in the management of the cor-
porate affairs, the shareholders are unable to break the dead-
lock and irreparable injury to the corporation is threatened or
being suffered, or the business and affairs of the corporation
can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the sharehold-
ers generally, because of the deadlock;
(b) The directors or those in control of the corporation have
acted, are acting or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppres-
sive or fraudulent;
(c) The shareholders are deadlocked in voting power and have
failed, for a period that includes at least two consecutive annu-
al meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms
have expired; or
(d) The corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.
(2) The remedies that the court may order in a proceeding under
subsection (1) of this section include but are not limited to the follow-
ing:
(a) The performance, prohibition, alteration or setting aside of
any action of the corporation or of its shareholders, directors or
officers or any other party to the proceeding;
(b) The cancellation or alteration of any provision in the corpo-
ration's articles of incorporation or bylaws;
(c) The removal from office of any director or officer;
(d) The appointment of any individual as a director or officer;
(e) An accounting with respect to any matter in dispute;
(f) The appointment of a custodian to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation, to serve for the term and under the
conditions prescribed by the court;
(g) The appointment of a provisional director to serve for the
term and under the conditions prescribed by the court;
(h) The submission of the dispute to mediation or another form
of nonbinding alternative dispute resolution;
(i) The issuance of distributions;
(j) The award of damages to any aggrieved party;
(k) The purchase by the corporation or one or more sharehold-
ers of all of the shares of one or more other shareholders for
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their fair value and on the terms determined under subsection
(5) of this section;
(1) The retention of jurisdiction of the case by the court for the
protection of the shareholder who filed the proceeding; or
(m) The dissolution of the corporation if the court determines
that no remedy specified in paragraphs (a) to (1) of this subsec-
tion or other alternative remedy is sufficient to resolve the
matters in dispute. In determining whether to dissolve the cor-
poration, the court shall consider among other relevant evi-
dence the financial condition of the corporation but may not re-
fuse to dissolve the corporation solely because it has
accumulated earnings or current operating profits.
(3) The remedies set forth in subsection (2) of this section shall not
be exclusive of other legal and equitable remedies that the court may
impose. Except as provided in this subsection, the shareholders of a
corporation may, pursuant to an agreement, agree to limit or elimi-
nate any of the remedies set forth in subsection (2) of this section.
The remedies set forth in subsection (2)(e), (j) and (m) [referring to
an accounting, an award of damages, and dissolution] of this section
may not be eliminated.
(4) In determining the appropriate remedies to order under subsec-
tion (2) of this section, the court may take into consideration the rea-
sonable expectations of the corporation's shareholders as they exist-
ed at the time the corporation was formed and developed during the
course of the shareholders' relationship with the corporation and
with each other. The court shall endeavor to minimize the harm to
the business of the corporation.
(5)(a) If the court orders a share purchase, the court shall:
(i) Determine the fair value of the shares, with or without the
assistance of appraisers, taking into account any impact on the
value of the shares resulting from the actions giving rise to a
proceeding under subsection (1) of this section;
(ii) Consider any financial or legal constraints on the ability of
the corporation or the purchasing shareholder to purchase the
shares;
(iii) Specify the terms of the purchase, including, if appropri-
ate, terms for installment payments, interest at the rate and
from the date determined by the court to be equitable, subor-
dination of the purchase obligation to the rights of the corpora-
tion's other creditors, security for a deferred purchase price
and a covenant not to compete or other restriction on the seller;
(iv) Require the seller to deliver all of the seller's shares to the
purchaser upon receipt of the purchase price or the first in-
stallment of the purchase price; and
(v) Retain jurisdiction to enforce the purchase order by, among
other remedies, ordering the corporation to be dissolved if the
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purchase is not completed in accordance with the terms of the
purchase order.
(A) The share purchase ordered under this subsection
shall be consummated within 20 days after the date the
order becomes final unless before that time the corpora-
tion files with the court a notice of its intention to dis-
solve and articles of dissolution are properly filed with
the Secretary of State within 50 days after filing the no-
tice with the court.
(B) After the purchase order is entered and before the
purchase price is fully paid, any party may petition the
court to modify the terms of the purchase, and the court
may do so if the court finds that the modifications are
equitable.
(C) Unless the purchase order is modified by the court,
the selling shareholder shall have no further rights as a
shareholder from the date the seller delivers all of the
shareholder's shares to the purchaser or such other date
specified by the court.
(6) In any proceeding under subsection (1) of this section, the court
shall allow reasonable compensation to the custodian, provisional di-
rector, appraiser or other such person appointed by the court for ser-
vices rendered and reimbursement or direct payment of reasonable
costs and expenses. Amounts described in this subsection shall be
paid by the corporation.
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